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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from his conviction in the 
Third Judicial District Court, Honorable Merrill C. 
Faux, Judge, presiding, of the crime of murder in 
the second degree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On March 25, 1969, the trial was held before 
Judge Faux. Appellant plead not guilty to a re-
duced charge of murder in the second degree. Upon 
a hearing of the evidence, as stipulated to by the 
prosecution and defense, Judge Faux found Gerald 
Scandrett guilty of murder in the second degree. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of appellant's 
conviction in the Third Judicial District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts presented to the Honorable Merrill C. 
Faux, Judge, were entered on stipulation by both 
parties. Respondent agrees with the statement of 
facts set out in appellant's brief. Respondent wishes 
to make an additional statement, however, abou1 
the confessions and the manner in which they were 
presented at the trial. 
This case is uniqUe because no jury was im-
paneled. The entire evidence and appellant's mo-
tion to suppress the recorded confession were pre-
sented to Judge Faux. 
The appellant, furthermore, made several vol-
untary statements to the police before a confession 
was ever recorded. All of these statements were 
presented to Judge Faux. Even though appellant 
was intoxicated, the officers who observed him said 
that he spoke coherently, appeared to understand 
questions put to him, and made intelligent and spon-
taneous responses to those questions (T. 108). 
It should also be noted that it was the appellant 
himself who directed the room clerk. to call the 




APPELLANT'S STATE OF INTOXICATION DID 
NOT DEPRIVE HIM OF THE REQUISITE MENTAL 
CAPACITY TO KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, AND 
VOLUNTARILY W A I VE HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS. 
Appellant contends that the admission into evi-
dence of the alleged confession was reversible 
error. He asserts that the confession was made with-
out the benefit of counsel and without a valid 
waiver of his constitutional rights. His contention is 
premised solely on the fact that because he was 
drunk he could not make an intelligent and know-
ing waiver. Respondent presented evidence show-
ing that the appellant was given his Miranda warn-
ings. 
Intoxication affecting an accused's ability to 
waive his rights and confess is a question to be de-
termined by the trial judge. Winn. v. State, 44 Ala. App. 
268, 207 So.2d 138 (1968). Judge Faux, after a hear-
ing, denied appellant's motion to suppress the con-
fession. He determined that appellant was coherent 
and could intelligently and knowingly waive his 
right to remain silent and his right to counsel. It 
should be noted that appellant's confession was not 
ever presented to a jury. The case was presented 
on stipulated facts before Judge Faux. The prejudi-
cial consequences of a jury hearing a confession 
were not present in this case. This is particularly 
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significant when it is noted that the appellant made 
voluntary statements before ever being taken into 
custody. This point will be discussed separately. This 
fact alone is sufficient to distinguish Logner v. North 
Carolina, 260 F. Supp. 970 (M.D. N.C. 1966). It also can 
be distinguished on other grounds. In Logner the de-
fendant was not only intoxicated but also under the 
influence of amphetamines. The amount consumed 
deprived him of the capacity to even make a state-
ment about the traffic accident in which he was in-
volved. The appellant Scandrett, on the other hand, 
was able to tell the story not only once but several 
times, and each time the story was coherent and 
consistent with the previous telling. 
Coherence, rationality, and responsiveness are 
all relevant factors in determining the extent of in-
fluence that alcohol has on a person when he con-
fesses or waives his rights. In Re Cameron, 68 Cal.2d 
487, 439 P.2d 633, 67 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1968). Whether 
an accused has intelligently waived his right tc 
counsel depends in each case upon the particular 
facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Ap-
pellant's conduct in the instant case indicated that 
he wanted to talk without counsel. In State v. Matt, 
444 P.2d 914 (Ore. 1968), the Oregon Supreme Court 
held that an intoxicated defendant by his conduct 
had waived his right to counsel. 
"A verbal acknowledgment of understand-
ing and willingness to talk, followed by conduct 
which is consistent only with a waiver of his 
right to have his lawyer present, by one who 
has been advised of his rights, constitutes an 
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effective waiver of his right to counsel at that 
stage of the proceeding." Id. at 915 
The trial judge in the instant case after listening 
to the recording of the confession determined that 
it was very coherent and that appellant could know-
ingly and intelligently waive his constitutional 
rights. The officers who observed the appellant testi-
fied that he spoke coherently, appeared to under-
stand the questions put to him, and made intelligent 
a.nd spontaneous responses to those questions (T. 
108). 
Mere intoxication does not prevent a person 
from making a valid waiver. In Fant v. Peyton, 303 F. 
Supp. 457 (W.D. Va. 1969), the court held that de-
fendant' s intoxicated condition did not prevent him 
from waiving his rights under Miranda. In People v. 
Stroud, 78 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1969), a California appellate 
court was faced with an almost identical fact situa-
tion as in the instant case. Stroud killed his wife 
about 6:00 p.m. He called a deputy sheriff who ar-
rived a little after 6:00. Stroud then confessed to the 
deputy. Later at 8:30 p.m. a tape recorder was set 
up, and Stroud was advised of his rights. He waived 
his rights and confessed. At 10:00 p.m., a blood alco-
hol test was taken. It revealed an alcohol content of 
.229 milligrams. Presumably the blood alcohol con-
tent would have been somewhat higher earlier 
when he made the confessions. After hearing the 
conflicting testimony, the trial judge ruled that de-
spite the amount of alcohol, Stroud was able to 
knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional 
rights under Miranda. In affirming the trial judge the 
appellate court said: 
"Keeping in mind the rule that our review 
of the record is not a fact finding process, we 
measure the .totality of circumstances in the 
light of uncontroverted evidence and the trial 
court's resolution of conflicting evidence. About 
the only pertinent uncontradicted fact is that 
at 10 p.m. defendant's alcohol blood content 
was .229 milligrams. But a blood alcohol content 
of .229, standing alone, neither proves nor dis-
proves defendant's capacity to understand and 
rationalize, since there is no established statutory 
or decisional standard correlating blood alcohol 
content with cerebral impairment of which this 
court can take judicial notice. Consequently the 
import of and inference to be drawn from an 
alcohol blood content of .229 must rest upon 
other relevant evidence." Id. at 276. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the present case the defense put on an expert 
witness. However, this expert witness had never 
observed anyone with a blood-alcohol count above 
.1 (R. 7 4). He admitted that a specified amount of 
alcohol in the blood would affect different indi-
viduals differently (R. 74, 75, 86), and that it would 
be "unprecise" to speculate on the extent of the im-
pairment of Scandrett's mental faculties at .26 (T. 
76, 83), and that it would have been "immeasurably" 
helpful to have been present and heard and ob-
served him while intoxicated (T. 83). 
The blood alcohol content in this case cannot 
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be relied upon as the sole factor in determining 
whether appellant waived his rights. It does not 
prove that appellant's capacity to understand was 
substantially impaired. Other relevant factors to be 
considered are the accused's response to questions, 
his voluntary statements, his manner of speaking, 
his syntax, his grammar, and his mode of speech 
as revealed by the taped statements. These factors, 
along with the blood alcohol level, were considered 
by the trial judge. He listened to the taped confes-
sion and ruled that Mr. Scandrett had made a 
knowing and intelligent waiver, and that the confes-
sion was admissible (T. 98-99). 
This ruling was correct. In the absence of any 
"statutory or decisional standard correlating blood 
alcohol content with cerebral impairiment," Judge 
Faux wa_s free to recognize and conclude that "much 
depends upon the reaction of each individual per-
son," and that appellant's ability to remember and 
narrate the incidents of the stabbing in smooth, un-
slurred speech, as revealed by the tape, was more 
conclusive proof of his mental capacity than was 
the expert testimony as to what appellant's mental 
capacity might have been. 
POINT IA 
SINCE THE APPELLANT KNOWINGLY. INTEL-
LIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HIS CON-
STITUTIONAL RIGHTS, HIS CONFESSION WAS 
PROPERLY ADMITI'ED IN EVIDENCE. 
To render a confession inadmissible, drug or 
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alcohol intoxication must be of such a degree as to 
negate the defendant's comprehension and render 
him unconscious of what he is saying. If the de-
fendant understands the statements directed to him 
and knows what he is saying, the confession is ad-
missible. State v. Manuel, 253 La. 195, 217 So.2d 369 
(1969). There was no evidence presented at the trial 
which indicated that appellant was unconscious of 
what he was saying. He understood the statements 
directed to him and voluntarily waived his rights be-
fore he confessed. 
A very comprehensive view of the cases on the 
subject of the effect of intoxication on the voluntari-
ness of confessions is found in 69 A.L.R.2d 361, 
wherein, at page 364, the annotation says: 
"The courts are agreed that proof that one 
who has confessed to crime was intoxicated at 
the time of making a confession goes to the 
weight and credibility to be accorded to the 
confession, but does not require (at least where 
the intoxication does not amount to mania, and 
the intoxicants were not furnished the ac-
cused by the police or other government of-
ficials) that the confession be excluded from 
evidence." 69 A.L.R. 2d 631, 364. 
This annotation appeared in 1960 and since that 
time many cases have considered the question be-
fore this Court. Even since Miranda, most of the cases 
refer to and approve the rule as stated in the anno-
tation. See: e.g., State v. Cuzzetto, 457 P.2d 204 (Wash., 
1969); State v. Manuel, supra; People v. Green, 105 Ill. 
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App.2d 345, 245 N.E.2d 507 (1969). In only three 
cases has it been held error to have admitted the 
confessions. But in each case the degree of intoxica-
tion amounted to mania, i.e., so drunk as to be un-
conscious of the meaning of his words. 
The case on which the appellant places his 
greatest reliance is Logner v. North Carolina, supra. Log-
ner, however, was so drunk when arrested that he 
could not make a statement about the traffic colli-
sion in which he was involved. He was still very 
drunk during the afternoon when he was interro-
gated. 
Also in Warren v. State, 44 Ala. App. 221, 205 So.2d 
916 (1967) the court said: 
"The proof clearly shows that defendant's 
intoxication amounted to mania, that is, he 
was so drunk as to be unconscious of the mean-
ing of his words, and that such intoxication 
rendered inadmissible his confession." Id. at 
225, 205 So.2d at 919. 
A similar result was reached in State v. Williams, 208 
So.2d 177 (Miss. 1968). The defendant's intoxication 
had produced mania, and his confession was held 
to be inadmissible. 
Respondent submits that this standard should be 
adopted by this Court in determining whether ap-
pellant's confession was voluntary and should have 
been admitted. The State further submits that appel-
lant's intoxication did not per se render his confes-
sion involuntary and hence inadmissible. His con-
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duct did not amount to mania or render him uncon-
scious of what he was saying. State v. Thornton, 22 
Utah 2d 140, 449 P.2d 987 (1969), in an analogous fact 
situation, is authority for this proposition. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S VOLUNTARY CONFESSION GIVEN 
TO OFFICER HUNT IS ADMISSIBLE UN D E R 
MIRANDA AND IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN HIS 
CONVICTION. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) applies only 
to custodial interrogations. 
". . . the prosecution may not use state-
ments, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, 
stemming from custodial interrogation of the 
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of 
procedural safeguards effective to secure the 
privilege against self-incrimination. By cus-
todial interrogation, we mean questioning 
initiated by law enforcement officers after a 
person has been taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of action in any signi-
ficant way." Id. at 444. 
It does not apply to confessions which are vol-
untary. In writing the opinion for the Court ,Mr. 
Chief Justice Warren emphasized: 
"There is no requirement that police stop 
a person who enters a police station and states 
that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a per-
son who calls the police to offer a confession or 
any other statement he desires to make. Volun-
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teered statements of any kind are not barred 
by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibil-
ity is not affected by our holding today." Id. at 
478. 
Appellant made several voluntary statements 
before he was arrested and taken into custody, and 
before he made the confession which is the subject 
of this appeal. After Officer Hunt arrived at the hotel 
where the stabbing occurred, he found the victim 
in the hallway. The appellant and a Mr. Ferguson 
were seated on the bed in the room and the door 
to the hallway was open. Officer Hunt heard the ap-
pellant say: "I did it; I did it; my fingerprints are on 
the knife." Subsequently, Captain Ferguson arrived 
and placed the appellant under arrest. Officer Hunt 
identified appellant as the person who had admitted 
stabbing Mr. Trujillo (T. 106-107). 
Ample authority exists for the rule that state-
ments made at the scene of the crime are admissible. 
See: e.g., Britton v. State, 44 Wis.2d 109, 170 N.W.2d 785 
(1969); State v. Jiminez, 22 Utah 2d 233, 451 P.2d 583 
(1969); Cash v. State, 224 Ga. 798, 164 S.E.2d 558 (1968); 
Miranda v. Arizona, supra. 
Appellant's confession is the classic example of 
a "threshold" confession, i.e., appellant initiated the 
call to the police and blurted out his guilt the 
moment an officer appeared on the scene. The con-
fession was spontaneous and unsolicited. It was 
given prior to any custodial interrogation; it was 
even prior to custody or investigative interrogation. 
It was the spontaneous expression of a "free will" 
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burdened with guilt. This confession was voluntar-
ily given in the traditional sense and Miranda does 
not require its exclusion, but on the contrary, 
sanctions its admission as evidence. 
This admissible statement when considered in 
light of other special circumstances, i.e., there was 
no jury, and no prejudice resulted to appellant be-
cause of the taped confession, is sufficient to sustain 
the conviction in this case. The Supreme Court of 
the United States has never reversed a conviction 
based in part on an inadmissible confession which 
was never before a jury, where there was a prior 
admissible confession which would support the con-
viction. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that some constitutional errors are harm-
less. 
"We are urged by petitioners to hold that 
all federal constitutional errors, regardless of 
the facts and circumstances, must always be 
deemed harmful. Such a holding, as petitioners 
correctly point out, would require an automatic 
reversal of their convictions and make further 
discussion unnecessary. We decline to adopt 
any such rule. All 50 States have harmless-
error statutes on rules, and the United States 
long ago through its Congress established for 
its courts the rule that judgments shall not be 
reversed for "errors or defects which do not 
affect the substantial rights of the parties." 
28 U.S.C. § 2111. None of these rules on its 
face distinguishes between federal constitutional 
errors and errors of state law or federal 
statutes and rules. All of these rules, state or 
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federal, serve a very useful purpose insofar as 
they block setting aside convictions for small 
errors or defects that have little, if any, likeli-
hood of having changed the result of the trial. 
We conclude that there may be some constitu-
tional errors which in the setting of a particular 
case are so unimportant and insignificant that 
they may, consistent with the Federal Consti-
tution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the 
automatic reversal of the conviction." Chapman 
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1967). 
In the absence of a controlling mandate from 
the High Court, many states have applied the harm-
less error rule to confessions obtained in violation 
of Miranda. In Soolook v. State, 447 P.2d 55 (Alaska 1968), 
the court applied the harmless error rule to a factual 
situation almost identical to the instant case. The de-
fendant had confessed to his parents in his own 
home before he was arrested. He was later arrested, 
given his Miranda warnings, and he confessed while 
in custodial interrogation. He was not intoxicated, 
but the court held that even assuming that the con-
fession was inadmissible, the error was harmless and 
did not require reversal. Id. at 65. The court relied 
on a Nevada case, Guyette v. State, 438 P.2d 244 (Nev. 
1968). The Guyette court held that failure to advise 
the accused of his right to the presence of counsel, 
either retained or appointed, constituted harmless 
error. The court said: 
"Although the High Court has not yet ruled 
that the doctrines of harmless error may be 
applied to a Miranda warning violation, thP drift 
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of its opinions would suggest that the rule of 
harmless error may be utilized when any of the 
new procedural safeguards, as expressed in 
[citations omitted], are breached. We say this 
mainly because the constitutional doctrines of 
those cases were not given retrospective appli-
cation, apparently for the reason that a viola-
tion may occur without necessarily affecting 
the fundamental fairness of the trial. Due pro-
cess in the traditional sense is not necessarily 
denied the accused. The very integrity of the 
fact finding process is not necessarily infected 
by the violation. The reliability of the evidence 
received is not necessarily suspect. Hence, the 
rule of "automatic reversal" does not control 
appellate disposition." Id. at 248. 
The Court then ruled that there was limited room 
for a "state court to consider the rule of harmless 
error when the procedural safeguards of Miranda are 
not fully honored." Id. at 249. 
The respondent submits that the facts of this 
case provide such a setting. The appellant was not 
denied due process of law. No jury considered the 
later confession. The appellant had made voluntary 
statements which were admissible and not objected 
to by defense counsel. The basic tests of reliability 
were met in this case. There was no police brutality 
or coercion. The appellant was given his complete 
Miranda warnings. The evidence shows that even 
though intoxicated, the statements made were vol-
untary. Finally, respondent notes that perhaps the 
most damning confession was made prior to inter-
rogation and completely admissible. Due process 
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was complied with. The trial judge made an inde-
pendent determination that the appellant's confes-
sion was admissible. But even assuming that this 
determination was error, it can be deemed harmless 
error and the prior confession can sustain the con-
viction. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the trial court did not 
err in denying appellant's motion to suppress his 
confession. The appellant intelligently, knowingly 
and voluntarily waived his right to counsel under 
Miranda. The confession was admissible and the con-
viction should be affirmed. 
Further, the threshold confession was admis-
sible and was sufficient to sustain appellant's con-
viction. Assuming that the later confession was in-
admissible, the rule of harmless error prevails. There 
was no jury and the prejudices which result be-
cause of inadmissible confessions were not present 
in this case. The conviction must be affirmed. 
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